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Using detailed primary data from Brazil, this paper investigates what problems
modernisation has created for unions within the white goods industry. Drawing from a
detailed analysis of the modernisation strategies of five firms and their effects on work
and on workers’ attitudes, the research applies a model of union identity to the experi-
ences of the unions at these sites. As it appears clear that workers are keen for unions to
have a new role in relation to recent changes to the workplace, the existence of ‘moder-
ate’, ‘strategic’ and ‘radical/political’ unions at the comprehensively modernised sites
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Within the recent literature on industrial modernisation one strand of argument
is that unions must and will develop more conciliatory relations with modernising
firms. This is based on the assumption that the modernisation process will create a new
‘mutuality’ of interests between workers and the firm. The corollary to this union iden-
tity option (for this optimistic school of thought) is that if unions do not cooperate and
moderate their approach they will become either social movements with no connection
to the workplace and/or increasingly irrelevant to the ‘irresistible’ forces of globalisa-
tion and companies’ new competitive strategies. On the other hand, other commentators
believe that moderation will seriously undermine unions’ effectiveness and that they
must therefore look for new, combative workplace strategies in order to have any
chance of surviving as representative bodies.
Using detailed primary data from Brazil, this paper investigates what problems
modernisation has created for unions within the white goods industry.
1 Drawing from a
detailed analysis of the modernisation strategies of five firms and their effects on work
and on workers’ attitudes, the research applies a model of union identity to the experi-
ences of the unions at these sites. As it appears clear that workers are keen for unions to
have a new role in relation to recent changes to the workplace, the existence of ‘moder-
ate’, ‘strategic’ and ‘radical/political’ unions at the comprehensively modernised sites
permits the analysis to compare the effectiveness of both ‘optimistic’ and ‘pessimistic’
union response hypotheses.
In terms of the specific Brazilian context, the paper suggests the following in re-
spect to the challenges of modernisation for unions. First, rather than offering new op-
portunities, modernisation has simply added to the difficult political and institutional
situation that Brazilian unions (particularly active ones) already face. Secondly, while
moderation may allow some unions to hold on to power and retain an adequate finan-
cial base, this does mean that they are either involved in workplace matters or repre-
sentative in any true sense. Thirdly, ‘radical/ political’ unionism faces the largest chal-
lenge from moderation as it appears that Brazilian managements’ ‘new’ HRM/TQM
policies continue to be based on the older objective of union avoidance. However, even 
                                                
1 The material comes from: Pegler, L. (2000) ‘Workers, Unions and the ‘‘Politics of Modernisation’’:
Labour Process Change in the Brazilian White Goods Industry’, Phd Thesis LSE, University of London;
and from follow up interviews with the firms and unions between November 2000 – January 2001.2
those unions which develop innovative, new workplace related strategies (for engaging
workers) will find that they face considerable difficulties gaining workers ‘ears’, par-
ticularly when plants are located in ‘greenfield’ sites.
Finally, while these specific conclusions have a relation to the Brazilian context,
they also hold great importance for unions in other developing or ‘transitional’ econo-
mies. In environments where there are political/institutional constraints on union ac-
tion, where social actors have not yet found a clear space for relations and where the
labour market is slack, often informal, and workers lowly paid and poorly educated,
modernisation adds another challenge to independent and active unions. Union hierar-
chies may also be destabilised as modernisation may lead to a much wider degree of
differentiation in employment and industrial relations conditions between areas, sectors
and firms. This will make attempts to develop union movement policies and to stan-
dardise conditions increasingly difficult and irrelevant.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2.0 (2.1) discusses the debates about
the effects of modernisation on unions as well as the range of possible union responses.
It then notes the model of identity used in the paper’s analysis. The section (2.2) then
discusses the institutional and political factors which define the Brazilian industrial re-
lations context. Section 3.0 summarises the nature of the modernisation process at the
case study firms, grouping them into ’comprehensive’ and ‘partial’ (moderniser) cate-
gories. The section also notes the results of research into workers attitudes to the em-
ployer and union at these firms. These results are most important in terms of what they
say about workers preferences for future union action. Section 4.0 is the core of the pa-
per. It applies the model of union identity to the unions at the firms, particularly the
most modernised ones. The analysis documents the interrelation of union identity, firm
strategy and context up to early 2001. Section 5.0 summarises and concludes the paper.3
2 THEORETICAL CONSTRUCTS AND THE BRAZILIAN CONTEXT
2.1 Responding to Change – Themes and Concepts
An important theme which emerged out of the 1990s debates about new factory
regimes, work and workers was - how did and, in fact, how should unions respond?
The body of optimistic (or managerialist) thought suggested that unions must and will
develop more conciliatory relations with modernising firms.
2 This seemed to flow from
the apparently simple idea that modernisation will lead to a change in attitudes and that
this will translate into the enhanced performance of the firm.
3 However, the links
within this idea - between changes to work and changing attitudes to work, the em-
ployer and union (thus the ‘necessity’ for unions to change) - have been challenged by
many studies.
4
How then will and must unions change within this optimistic ‘mutual gains’
schema? First, as suggested above, unions must listen to workers (apparently) new de-
mands and look for ways in which they can engage employers in a constructive dia-
logue in respect to these themes.
5 Training and personal development are two key is-
sues which have often been suggested as good examples for such an approach.
6 On the
other hand, it is also noted that unions may choose to expand their combative and po-
litical role as a social movement (but have no connection to the workplace).
7
Critics of this optimistic perspective on industrial modernisation believe that
moderation will seriously undermine unions’ effectiveness and that they therefore must
look for new combative workplace strategies in order to have any chance of surviving
as representative bodies.
8 But what form must these strategies take? Most unions have
                                                
2 See for example, M. Piore, ‘Unions: A Reorientation to Survive’, in: Labor Economics and Industrial
Relations, eds. C. Kerr and P. Staudohar (London 1994), pp 512-544.
3 A point succinctly made in Lincoln, J. and A. Kallenberg, Culture, Control and Commitment (Cam-
bridge1989), p 4.
4 For a review of a number of critical US and UK studies see: Pegler, ‘The Politics of Modernisation’,
Ch. 1, pp 10-14 and pp 20-27.
5 See, Piore, ‘Unions…Reorientation’ and Kochan, T. and P. Osterman, The Mutual Gains Enterprise
(Boston 1994).
6 See: W. Streeck, 'Training and the New Industrial Relations: A Strategic Role for Unions?', in: The
Future Labour Movements , ed. M. Regini (London 1992).
7 See: N. Bacon and J. Storey, ‘Individualism and Collectivism and the Changing Role of Trade Unions’
in: The New Workplace and Trade Unionism, eds. P. Ackers, C. Smith and P. Smith, (London 1996).
8 For a critical discussion of these issues see P. Ackers, C. Smith and P. Smith, The New Workplace and
Trade Unionism (London 1996). Typologies of union responses can be found in D. Guest, ‘Human Re-
source Management, Trade Unions and Industrial Relations’ in: Human Resource Management : A Criti-
cal Text, ed. J. Storey, (London 1995)’ and Hyman, R. ‘Changing Trade Union Identities and Strategies’,
in: New Frontiers in European Industrial Relations, eds. R. Hyman and A. Ferner (London 1994).4
had to face difficulties due to issues such as structural/demographic change on many
occasions in the past. Yet the more complex and ambiguous training, evaluation and
involvement mechanisms within the modernising firm may encourage workers to be
more focussed on workplace issues - ones in which many unions are presently not in-
volved or prepared for. Moreover, such a change in workers’ attitudes may also chal-
lenge the effectiveness of unions’ broader political objectives and campaigns.
Aside from the above workplace or social movement options, these ‘new ter-
rains’ of conflict have also led to a number of combined micro-macro options for un-
ions, such as Hyman’s ‘business unionism with a social conscience’.
9 The greatest dif-
ference between all of these suggestions for union strategy is, however, over whether
unions should be moderate or militant. Yet, in themselves, neither of these two con-
cepts provides either a useful practical description of realities or a conceptual guide to
possible future strategies.
For example, at a practical level, unless it is assumed that employers have be-
come pro-union, a harsh facilitating environment may have clear effects on any union
strategy. Secondly, the evolution into a social movement represents a major change to
unions as most know them. On the other hand, few unions have a structure and history
of workplace relations that even gets close to the model of workplace involvement that
has been achieved in countries such as Germany and Sweden. Moreover, both these
examples of workplace involvement are not without their problems.
10 One lesson they
appear to present is that union success must be based on a strong workplace role plus
macro coordination and a strong, positive recognition of unions in law.
11 The lack of
any clear international evidence suggesting workers ‘dual allegiance’ (to both employer
and union) would appear to support the need for these features – especially if unions
are to survive as independent, representative bodies.
12
                                                
9 Hyman, R. ‘European Unions: towards 2000’ in: Work, Employment and Society, (1991), 5,4.
10 See Kern, H. and C. Sabel, 'Trade Unions and decentralized production: a Sketch of Strategic Prob-
lems in the German Labour Movement', in: Future Labour, ed. M. Regini.
11 A point well made by M. Terry, ‘Workplace Unionism: Redefining Structures and Objectives’, in New
Frontiers, eds. Hyman and Ferner and by, C. Crouch, ‘The Fate of Articulated Industrial Relations Sys-
tems: a stock taking after the ‘Neo-liberal’ Decade’, in: Future Labour, ed. M. Regini and L. Turner,
Democracy at Work: Changing World Markets and the Future of Labor Unions, (Cornell 1991).
12 Noted for the literature in Lincoln and Kallenberg, Culture, p 4 and for their study , ch. 9. In fact, in-
ternational studies note that job satisfaction has strong links to reduced turnover and absenteeism and not
to company allegiance (D. Guest, ‘Human Resource Management and industrial relations’ in: Journal of
Management Studies, (1987), 24, 5, pp 513-514 and Lincoln and Kallenberg, Culture, p 25.5
At a conceptual and analytical level, these issues challenge us to find frame-
works which allow a more contextually sensitive evaluation of unions (on issues such
as union effectiveness, success and representation) within this (new) environment. For
example, with the modernising employer increasingly trying to persuade workers to go
‘beyond (the wage-effort) contract’ and take a firm specific but individualist perspec-
tive, how far should unions try to influence, as opposed to follow, the opinions of
workers and still be considered a representative and independent voice of workers? On
 the other hand, even if a union has been able to alter workplace conditions, who has
this benefitted? That is, if conditions are becoming more variegated and individualised,
have unions’ interests and agendas adjusted so that they could (still) be considered col-
lective and representative?
In an attempt to add depth to a ‘moderate vs militant’ perspective on these is-
sues, this research attempted to apply a concept of identity.
13 The model employed is
one which considers the nature of interests served by the union, its level of democracy
and the union agenda. Union identity is defined as the relationship of these factors to
whether and how a union is able to exert power/control within its particular context.
The central elements of this model (figure 1) are discussed below.
FIGURE 1
The identity model








A union’s interests relate to whom and in what types of issues it is interested.
Challenges common to most unions are whether they can expand their interest base and
still be representative. Unions may have more difficulty (than in the past) resolving
their interests in an environment where internal factory conditions take on relatively
 greater importance (for workers) than factors external to the firm.
ii) Union agenda:
A union’s agenda is evident not only from its formal policies and constitution
but also from the priorities implicit within its day-to-day strategies. In this regard,
quantitative demands fit more easily within unions' traditional orientation. On the other
hand, qualitative demands, such as those raised by modernisation, are more challenging
of managerial authority. In the face of modernising employers, a union's agenda could
(in a stylised sense) become either, 1) more collaborative and narrow in scope, or 2)
actively questioning of employers and broader in focus.
iii) Union democracy:
The third factor concerns the problematic issue of union democracy. To go fully
into the debates about union democracy is beyond the scope of this paper. However, a
principal question of these debates is whether an ‘iron law of oligarchy’ (a conflict
between union efficiency and democracy) is inevitable.
14 Conflicts of this type are said
to be heightened by modernisation.
15
The analysis of this research is based on the proposition that participation is the
key issue behind democracy and that this will also determine a union’s effectiveness.
16
The concept employed, participant representation, departs from an internal electoral
model of democracy often derived from the ‘iron law’ proposition. This ‘iron law’, or
goal displacement proposition, was based on three related arguments. These were that;
the demands of organisational effectiveness would lead to divisions between leaders
and the rank and file; this would be perpetuated by leaders increasing interest in re
                                                                                                                                 
13  Derived from R. Hyman, ‘Changing Trade Union Identities and Strategies’, in: New Frontiers in
European Industrial Relations, eds. R. Hyman and A. Ferner (London 1994).
14 R. Michels, Political Parties (New York 1959, 1st ed. 1915).
15 As noted by Kern and Sabel, ‘Unions and Decentralised Production’
16 As noted/used by W. Mangabeira, ‘Union Politics and workplace militancy: a case study of Brazilian
steelworkers in the 1980s’, (1991), PhD Thesis, LSE, University of London, ch 1.7
maining in power and; that an antagonism of interests would grow between a radical
workforce and growing moderation by union leaders.
17 
The internal consistency and assumptions of these arguments have been seri-
ously challenged in the literature.
18 Furthermore, the use of electoral models and an
emphasis on internal institutional aspects of unions
19 neglects external factors.
20. Most
importantly, the implicit assumption that unions must solely follow workers’ demands
does not necessarily indicate that unions are representative.
21
What does appear important is whether active collaboration exists between
workers and the union. The process of participative representation will be a function of
resource availability and local conditions. It is a socially constructed process wherein a
representative union seeks workers’ views, interprets their demands, proposes new
themes, reports back to workers and pursues members’ demands.
22
Participant representation may be more difficult to achieve as modernisation
proceeds. This is because modernisation may lead to 1) fewer workers being interested
in the union, and/or 2) viewpoints of a union’s role becoming more diverse or even
diametrically opposed. This may or may not destabilise the union. It may or may not
also lead to particular groups taking control of the union or others facing unfair obsta-
cles to the challenging of this group (i.e. the ‘iron law’ debate). More fundamentally,
modernisation could reduce the incentive for and effectiveness of mechanisms of par-
ticipation and accountability.
iv) Union Power:
One possible power implication of this model is therefore that, as workplaces
                                                
17 Ibid.
18 See Ibid. and P. Cook, ‘Robert Michels Political Parties in Perspective’ in: The Journal of Politics
(1971) 33; and S. Hill, Competition and Control at Work (London 1981). Cook criticises the concept for
implicitly assuming the working class as a radical group and leaders as supporting the status quo. Hill
criticises a necessary link being made between goal displacement and oligarchic tendencies.
19 Such as is done by J. Edelstein and M. Warner, Comparative Union Democracy (New Jersey 1979); R.
Martin, ‘Union Democracy: An Explanatory Framework’in: Sociology (1968) 2, 2 and I. Roxborough,
Unions and Politics in Mexico – the case of the automobile industry (Cambridge 1984).
20 As is argued by, E. Heery and P. Fosh, ‘Introduction: whose union? Power and bureaucracy in the la-
bour movement’ in: Trade Unions and their members: studies in union democracy and organization, eds.
P. Fosh and E. Heery (1990), pp 1-28, and in respect to Mexico, K. Middlebrook, ‘Union Democratiza-
tion in the Mexican Auto Industry’, L.A.R.R., 24, 2.
21 Demonstrated in other Brazilian situations by Mangabeira, ‘Union Politics’, and J. Morais, ‘New Un-
ionism and Union Politics in Pernambuco (Brazil) in the late 1980s’ (1992), PhD Thesis, LSE, Univer-
sity of London.
22 Noted by Morais, ‘New Unionism and Union Politics’, ch. 1.8
modernise unions will tend to become less powerful and influential at both the work-
place and political level. On the other hand, optimists suggest that moderate unions
which concentrate on workplace themes will be able to retain or regain their influence
and power. This might also be the case if unions have little to do with workplace mat-
ters.
In summary, this subsection has noted the implications (for unions) of many recent
management and workplace developments. Modernisation will intensify the difficult po-
sition in which most unions already find themselves - at the workplace and in the political
arena. Despite the optimism of some recent writers, it appears that few environments offer
unions the conditions which allow them to resolve these conflicts and remain representa-
tive and effective.
The prospects of a truly inclusive stance by employers to unions, a facilitative
framework and dual allegiance to the employer and union do not look very high, espe-
cially in countries such as Brazil. However, the process by which a union responds to this
situation is full of ambiguities and constraints. The use of a model of union identity may
allow this process to be more adequately described. The following subsection summarises
the political and institutional context in which this analysis is placed.
2.2 The Brazilian Industrial Relations Context
The political and institutional environment in Brazil has traditionally been a
very tough and constraining one for workers and unions. A quite exclusionary and cor-
poratist industrial relations model and its place within an authoritarian political system
meant that few could foresee changes such as those (e.g. more democratic workplaces
or the possibility of greater union inclusion) suggested by modernisation optimists.
23
However, by the 1990s quality and productivity had become popular slogans of indus-
try and government and there were clear signs that a broad range of firms were begin-
ning to apply quite comprehensive modernisation models.
24
                                                
23 For a classic work on this history see: G. Gomes, The Roots of State Intervention in the Brazilian
Economy (London 1986).
24 For example, in 1990 the Federal Government launched an assistance programme for quality and pro-
ductivity in industry along the lines suggested by optimistic theory .– Ministério da Justiça et al., Pro-
grama Brasileiro da Qualidade e Productividade (Brasília 1990). One of the more optimistic Brazilian
studies is – J. Gonçalves and C.Dreyfus (coords), Reengenharia das Empressas – Passando a limpo (São
Paulo 1995).9
Nevertheless, the effects of these policies on workers continue to be hotly de-
bated.
25 There are indications that many such firms have responded to the threat of their
greater dependence (on workers’ attitudes) through new systems of control. The fact
that ‘greenfields’ sites are being used and that unions are not being involved would
seem to support this.
Thus, despite a more open political and institutional environment, an underlying
current of distrust still remains. Part of this emanates from the uncertain situation many
workers and unions face in the workplace and labour market but it is also because many
of the old legal structures (governing unions) remain while at the same time legislators
have now embraced a concept of ‘flexibility’.
26 At the macro level, these developments
have acted to further destabilise and divide the union movement. The following para-
graphs briefly describe key aspects of the industrial relations model and labour move-
ment situation which make up this context.
The state based development model and the very encompassing set of rules
governing union and worker behaviour, which began in the 1930s, changed little up to
the mid-1980s.
27 While applied to different degrees by subsequent regimes, the indus-
trial relations model continued to be based on three ‘pillars’. These were – the regula-
tory role of the Ministry of Labour, the Labour Code and related social welfare and la-
bour court systems.
One of the effects of these codes and bodies was to determine, oversee and en-
force a model of unionism which made unions non-workplace based, social welfare
administrators. Various regulations governing union structures and finances and the
normative powers of the labour courts to curtail strikes meant that unionism at all levels
was largely controlled. While many basic statutory work benefits had been codified,
workers were largely left to the whims of a very paternalistic and authoritarian em-
ployer class for the determination of their conditions.
28
Economic constraints and social and political pressure starting in the late 1970s 
                                                
25 See for a summary: Pegler, ‘The Politics of Modernisation’, ch 2, pp 74 – 95.
26 One of the more controversial of these is the possibility of firms introducing a ‘banca das horas’ – that
is a system by which hours are averaged over the year. This makes HRM planning more flexible but,
unless unions can negotiate differently, there is the loss of overtime.
27 he features of the model (described below) are not disputed in the literature. See, for example, K. Erik-
son, The Brazilian Corporative State and Working Class Politics (Berkeley 1977) and M. Alves, ‘Trade
Unions in Brazil: A Search for Autonomy and Organisation’ in Labour Autonomy and the State in Latin
America, ed. E. Epstein, (Boston 1989), pp 39-45.
28 See, for example, in terms of the military period, Alves, ‘Trade Unions in Brazil…’, pp 47-49.10
led to a slow process of democratisation post-1985.
29 While the economy and economic
policy oscillated considerably during the decade of the 1980s, in 1989 many of the con-
straints on union and worker action were relaxed.
30 However, the monopoly of repre-
sentation of local unions was retained, as was the system of automatic union financing.
Moreover, workplace representation rights (and other issues of importance to the ‘new
union’ movement) remain uncertain and dependent on local bargaining. This has meant
that unions can still survive without having to be active and representative, particularly
at the workplace level.
On top of these enduring structures, during the 1990s the Government put into
place a series of initiatives aimed at promoting quality, productivity and flexibility in
Brazilian industry.
31 Support programmes for workplace adjustment were introduced
and the general legislative environment began to make it easier for employers to nego-
tiate and adjust wages and conditions on a more decentralised level.
32 While workers
and unions have been offered some hope – for example, through the improved possi-
bility of establishing work place committees - a continuing state of labour market
slackness, job insecurity and employer flexibility to deploy labour within the workplace
have kept such possibilities mainly in the theoretical realm.
Within such an ambiguous and divided environment, unions will have difficulty
competing with the subtler, persuasive internal strategies of modernising employers. In
addition, resource constraints may make it all the more difficult for a union to develop
separate policies for different groups of workers within and between the factories in
their ambit.
33 The institutional and workplace context for any local Brazilian union who
wants to take on a militant and representative identity thus remains very slim – possibly
more difficult than the past. As the following discussion of unionism at the macro level
notes, past structures and recent developments have also constrained vertical and hori-
zontal union coordination. This has limited the degree to which local unions might be
able to rely on union structures in their efforts to gain from the modernisation process.
                                                
29 See, M. Keck, ‘The New Unionism in the Brazilian Transition’ in: Democratising Brazil: problems of
transition and consolidation, ed. A.Stepan, (London 1989).
30 These issues are well discussed in – J. Morais, ‘New Unionism and Union Politics in Pernambuco
(Brazil) in the 1980s’, (1992), Phd Thesis, LSE, University of London, pp 58-59.
31 See footnote 24.
32 See footnote 26.
33 Modernisation practices plus the legislative changes noted earlier may make these developments more
likely.11
For example, during much of the 20C the formal rules of the industrial relations
system did not allow for central union organisations.
34. Vertical industrial groupings up
to the national level represented the coordinating form that was allowed by the formal
rules of the model. In reality, various extra-legal groups evolved and these vied for po-
litical supremacy. However, their periodic involvement within a (often unstable) series
of populist regimes plus their lack of any real workplace links meant that they were not
as strong as they seemed and could be dismantled and disorganised relatively easily.
35.
However, despite or because of economic and political problems, the 1970s saw
the beginnings of a new, more representative union grouping (‘new unionism’).
36. This
group seemed distinct as they put considerably more effort into workplace relations and
due to the way they came to challenge the state. During the 1980s this group tried (but
failed) to put together (what was still an illegal) parallel union central that encompassed
most opposition union groupings. Yet in the end CUT (Central Única das Trabal-
hadores) was still formed and this organisation was the main force behind the creation
of a labour party (the PT – Partida Trabalhista) based on similar principles of repre-
sentation and accountability.
37
Between the 1980s and 1990s various competing union centrals continued to
exist.
38 The prospect of horizontal union coordination became even more remote when
one group took on a new leader, a new name (Força Sindical) and clearer but more
conservative style. ‘Unionism of results’ and a more employer friendly approach to ne-
gotiated change became two of its key identifying features. Despite its non-political
rhetoric the approach of this union echoed older values – political processes remained
the key focus to the detriment of any substantive, critical involvement in workplace de-
velopments and labour rights.
39
                                                
34 Well described in: K. Erickson, The Brazilian Corporative State and Working Class Politics (Berkeley
1977).
35 See: H. Spalding, ‘Labour and Populism: Argentina and Brazil’ in: Organized Labour in Latin Amer-
ica, ed. H. Spalding (London 1977), pp. 185-189, and M. Bordin, ‘The Brazilian Industrial Relations
System (1930-64): Unionism or Corporatism?’, Labour and Society (1986), 11, 1, pp.126-30 and Erick-
son, Brazilian Corporative State, ch. 6.
36 See on these developments: E. Sader, Quando novos personagens entraram em cena: experiências,
falas e lutas dos trabalhadores da Grande São Paulo (1970-80) (Rio de Janeiro 1988).
37 See Pegler, ‘Politics of Modernisation’, ch. 2, pp. 52-54.
38 Ibid. pp. 69-71 – as paraphrased below.
39 For a view on this group’s programme and founding conference see, DIEESE, Boletim DIEESE, 4/91,
p. 11 and M. Martins, Sindicalismo e Relações Trabalhistas  (São Paulo 1991), p. 154.12
The ambiguities for horizontal union coordination and stronger vertical struc-
tures (which might help local, independent unions) continued in other ways.
40 For in-
stance, even the CUT supported the retention of the automatic deduction for union fi-
nancing during the late 1980s. On the other hand, in the 1990s this group was most ac-
tive in promoting a system of collective contracts and sector re-development packages.
They also set up a series of training schools in which the study of critical perspectives
on workplace change have been key parts.
41 However, the further decentralisation of
industrial relations has hampered collective concept developments as well the extension
of sector agreements beyond certain areas and industries. Força Sindical’s more ex-
plicit vocational focus for worker training (e.g. for computer and technical skills) is an-
other example of how these two competing centrals continue to differ.
In summary, Brazilian unions continue to face difficulties which emanate from
both the workplace and macro level. The intent behind employers’ recent modernisa-
tion strategies remains in question, rules and regulations for industrial relations have
become more flexible and decentralised (within a slack labour market) and union cen-
trals are both divided and constrained in their ability to coordinate and assist the major-
ity of local unions who are struggling to survive. At a general level, these are not con-
ditions which would lead us to believe in an optimistic union outcome at the local level.
The application of the union identity model to ‘radical/political-militant’, ‘strategic-
militant’ and ‘moderate’ unions within the same industry allows this study to explore
the optimistic and pessimistic union response hypotheses much more deeply. Prior to
this analysis, however, the next section briefly summarises the nature of the firm level
modernisation experiments to which these unions have been responding.
                                                
40 Pegler, ‘The Politics of Modernisation’, Ibid.
41 For example, between 1991-93 the CUT set up three regional union training schools. The sessions on
labour process themes held at the schools echo the high importance these issues hold for the CUT. Arti-
cles on these themes form the core of publications such as - Central Unica dos Trabalhadores (CUT),
Revista da Secretaria National de Formação- Forma e Conteúdo, no. 4, 9/91.; CUT, Plano Nacional de
Formação da CUT 1992, April, 1992.; Confederação National dos Metalurgicos da CUT (CNM/CUT),
Revista dos Metalúrgicos, ano 1, no.1, 12/93.13
3 FACTORY MODERNISATION, MANAGERIAL INTENT AND
WORKERS’ ATTITUDES
3.1 Modernisation and the New, Open Employer
Four comparable firms from within the previously unstudied ‘white goods’ in-
dustry were chosen as case studies. Two of these firms (three factories) produced re-
frigeration products and the other two washing products. Four of these factories (Bras-
temp-Rio Claro/Sao Bernardo and Consul I/II) are part of Whirlpool’s operations in
Brazil. As shown by the product specific Tables 3 and 4 in the appendix, for each prod-
uct group there was a comprehensively modernised firm and (at least) one traditional
firm. As discussed in detail elsewhere, the data on their policies, processes and out-
comes suggest that many of the features of the optimistic argument were supported by
these case studies.
42
For example, in terms of management style and structures, Brastemp–Rio Claro
and Consul III promoted a mission statement and management strategy which reflects
the quality, continuous improvement and human resources principles of TQM and
HRM in a classical sense. This strategy went quite deep with each firm making signifi-
cant reductions in reporting hierarchies as well as instigating new participative mecha-
nisms, cells and training opportunities. These changes accompanied the integration of
new process technologies and techniques such as JIT/Kanban and maintenance/quality
procedures into the work of many labourers.
In terms of employee relations, management at the two comprehensively mod-
ernised firms introduced closer team relations, reduced overt supervision and created
numerous opportunities to contribute. Here, the workers also benefited from a very
clean, organised ambient and substantial new training opportunities. At Brastemp-Rio
Claro workers also have a shorter working week and a career scheme, the ultimate level
of which would make them a multiskilled, technical worker.
In terms of outcomes, many of these results also fit the optimistic model. For
example, productivity was much higher at Brastemp-Rio Claro and Consul III. Labour
turnover was also much lower there. This suggests that greater stability is evident, that 
                                                
42 Pegler, ‘The Politics of Modernisation’, ch 4. The following discussion is a summary much like that
which appears in, ‘Employer Dependence and Worker Allegiance within the Factory of the Future: Evi-
dence from Brazil’ in: Revista Brasileira de Ciencias Sociais, ANPOCS, 2002, vol 17/ no. 48, pp. 139-
142.14
employers can recoup much of their training costs and that workers may have been
happier to remain at the firm. Finally, these statistics suggest that direct supervision
has, in fact, been much lower at the comprehensively modernised firms.
However, there were a number of caveats to this picture.
43 These act to question
the intent of management. For example, ‘greenfields’ (Brastemp –Rio Claro) or low
wage location allowed them to offer wages which are low on industry standards but
adequate for their local labour markets. Secondly, both of these firms use extensive se-
lection criteria and training programmes which do not closely match cognitive abilities
to perform tasks. Workers at each firm are intensively ‘trained’ and screened in relation
to attitudes to the employer and industrial disputation, ‘what is quality’, the ‘impor-
tance of the firm’, etc.
At Brastemp-Rio Claro the qualitative nature of the labour use model is the
most highly developed. For example, their career scheme awards skills, training and
attitudes and workers are involved in the evaluation of their teammates. It is not hard to
imagine that this would be difficult and divisive for workers while at the same time
make it easier for the firm to relinquish some of its former direct supervision func-
tions.
44
Supporting this greater internal control interpretation is the observation that, at
Joinville Consul (and Whirlpool) went to great lengths to replace the combative local
union with a passive one. Overall Brazilian Whirlpool production has been progres-
sively moved away from Brastemp-São Bernardo (a key area of high wages and union
militancy) to Brastemp-Rio Claro and Consul-Joinville (one a ‘greenfield’ site and the
other with a passive union). It appears to be of no coincidence that Whirlpool’s pur-
chase of Consul, Brastemp (and Embraco – the key input supplier company) has al-
lowed the group to minimise unions, disputation and wages in this way.
Finally, Brastemp - São Bernardo has recently been closed and many of the
other factories have made various organisational adjustments to their operations since
this research. However, analysis continues to confirm that, while many aspects of work
have improved, these comprehensively modernising firms have developed stronger in-
ternal control mechanisms and external barriers so that their dependence on the skills
                                                
43 Ibid.
44 Even greater support for the degree of managerial prerogative involved can also be seen from the fact
that the firm was easily able to put the career scheme on hold (due to their concerns about  wage growth)
in 1998 and reinstitute it in 2001.15
and attitudes of their workers is minimised and, so that external threats to this are con-
tained or avoided.
45 The following subsection summarises how this situation made
workers feel about the employer vis-a-vis the union. This provides a clear lead into this
papers detailed analysis of how the unions have responded to workers’ desires and to
firm level and industrial relations developments in the years up to 2001.
3.2 The Axis of Allegiance – Workers’ Attitudes to the Employer and Union
The history of Brazilian workplace relations, while often paternalistic, would
appear to suggest that workers have good reasons not to have much trust in employers.
The unrepresentative nature of many unions during much of the 20th century also sug-
gests that most workers will have little faith in unions’ desire or ability to improve their
working lives. It was thus most instructive to note in our research that the firm had be-
come a strong referent for workers and that the union remained of minimal interest to
most workers.
46 However, as the following discussion notes, there are strong caveats to
workers belief in the modernising firm plus indications that particular union strategies
would gain them much greater worker support.
In terms of the employer, the main results which emerged were as follows.
47
First, while part of this may be explained by regional wage comparisons, workers at the
low wage Rio Claro site were happiest with their pay. More tellingly, workers at the
two comprehensively modernised firms were significantly more happy with their con-
ditions overall and took a more inward looking perspective in terms of their evaluation
of their situation. These results suggested greater allegiance to the modernising firm.
However, many workers felt that they had not gained much whilst particular
groups (the skilled) had high expectations. These qualifications were added to by the
fact that many workers were sceptical about whether they would gain. Participation was
focussed on firm issues, training had not made them more employable and most be-
lieved that they were only being given these benefits and expectations due to the firms
desire to increase profit. Once again, workers responses at Brastemp- Rio Claro showed
greater optimism. Yet this may no longer be the case as other comprehensively mod
                                                
45 Pegler, ‘Politics of Modernisation’, ch 5. This is also the case for the 1995-2001 period as confirmed in
company interviews (January, 2001).
46 Ibid., p. 221.
47 See: Pegler, ‘Employer Dependence and Worker Allegiance’, pp.142-145.16
ernised firms (offering better terms and conditions) have recently arrived in this (previ-
ously ’greenfield’) region.
More pessimistically, in respect to the important issue of career development
and participation, workers at the two comprehensively modernised sites were against
their evaluation systems whilst other workers were not. Despite their more open and
participative schemes, these workers felt that they were biased to training and involved
unreasonable peer pressure. Dissatisfaction of this type was also seen from the fact they
were just as likely to leave their firm voluntarily as were workers at the more tradi-
tional, ‘hire-and fire’ firms.
Consequently, workers were seen to exhibit only instrumental or ‘as if’ attach-
ment to the modernising firm. Similarly, workers’ needs of their union were also quite
instrumental.
48 Yet their views also had a strong relation to context and union strategy.
Moreover, what they suggested for the future was that a particular style of unionism
might offer these organisations greater hope of gaining worker support. While union-
ism varied considerably between sites, a consideration of all workers’ views presents a
most interesting picture for the ensuing analysis of union identity.
For example, across the sample most thought that unions and their policies were
not good. The combination of a legacy of non-representative unions and firm level
‘persuasion’ and selection policies appears to be behind this. Yet it is particularly im-
portant to note that workers at the comprehensively modernised Consul III site were
more against the passive, company union than their (more actively unionised) work-
mates in the more traditional Consul II factory. Informal links were still strong with the
older combative union at Consul II.
More tellingly, workers gave their union a more positive endorsement if it was
seen to have active policies dealing with workplace change. In terms of the future, there
was clear support for future active workplace policies as 60% felt that the union should
be involved in such matters and as 55% of workers felt that their union was not, but
should be, more involved in workplace developments on behalf of workers. This was a
particular criticism of modernised Consul III workers of their passive union.
However, the views of workers at the other comprehensively modernised firm
(Brastemp –Rio Claro) once again stood out. While in favour of unions in general, they 
                                                
48 Ibid., pp. 145-148.17
had few wishes for their ‘strategic-militant’ union to have a specific role in their work-
place. Nevertheless, the emergence of ‘better’ employers in the region (a number of
whom have allowed union factory committees) may act to change this situation.
49
In summary, at the time of the original research, management at the ultra mod-
ern Brastemp-Rio Claro had achieved a workforce which, while often positive about
unions in general, did not feel they needed a union at their particular site. While this
may change, outside of such ‘greenfields’ situations it appears that if a union is both
independent and actively involved in workplace matters they may not loose worker
support. The responses of workers at the other sites (both traditional and highly mod-
ernised) suggested that there may even be a chance that workers will increase their at-
tachment to, and support of, a union of this type. The next section of this paper looks at
how the unions have responded and to which type of unionism has been most effective,
successful and representative.
                                                
49 This situation was observed and noted in union interviews in Limeira in January 2001. Whether the
union has or will make use of these developments is another question.18
4 UNION IDENTITY – A QUESTION OF MODERATION OR
MILITANCY?
The case study union situations differed greatly (table 3).
50 For example, the São
Bernardo metal workers situation contrasts with the other union contexts as they are a
large, well-resourced, organised and influential organisation in the major industrial hub of
Brazil. This union played a key role in the development of a more representative union
movement, in the formation of the Workers’ Party (the PT) and in the 1980s transition to
democracy. However, the case study firm they represented (Brastemp-São Bernardo) was
less modernised than many of the other firms within their ambit.
In stark contrast, the unions at the other three locations are small, regional entities
in much less industrialised locations. The CUT and the PT are also very important to the
union covering one of the comprehensively modernised locations (Brastemp-Rio Claro).
Yet CUT/PT groups only share power with Communist groups at Enxuta’s union. In ad-
dition, while the CUT is important to the Joinville Mecânicos, this union formally lost
coverage for workers at the other comprehensively modernised site (Consul III) and the
other partially modernised site (Consul II). The union that took over at these two sites
(Sinditherme) claimed to take a neutral political stance. Yet there were indications that it
had aligned itself with Força Sindical.
TABLE 1
Identifying features of the case study unions










































Notes: Força Sind. = Força Sindical; CUT = Central Única dos Trabalhadores; CGT = Confederação Geral dos Trabal-
hadores; PC do B = Communist Party of Brazil.
                                                
50 Discussion here drawn from, Pegler, ‘The Politics of Modernisation’, ch. 7, pp. 256-261.19
The case studies also offered a vivid, but inconclusive, picture of union identity
when looked at using unionisation statistics (table 2). For example, militant unionism at
the two most advanced sites (Brastemp-Rio Claro, Consul III) and Consul II faced diffi-
culties either due to ‘greenfield’ conditions or because of the installation of a moderate
union. However, unionisation was much higher (50% vs 16%) at the firm (Consul) cov-
ered by the moderate union (Sinditherme). In comparison, while CUT and radical groups
dominated the unions of the two least modernised factories, unionisation also differed sig-
nificantly between them. Brastemp-São Bernardo had a unionisation rate of 79% and
Enxuta 25%.
Thus, if unionisation is the sole measure used, it is clear that militant unionism
is not enough to ensure the union has a large ‘electoral’ base. Yet, whether this means
that moderate unionism does any better in reality also requires more in-depth analysis.
Table 2






















Source: Company and union records and interview data.
Through the application of an identity model to the case study unions (particularly at the
highly modernised sites), the rest of this section provides a more detailed perspective on
unions’ fortunes.
In this regard, figure 2 below stylises four possible scenarios for unions. This pro-
vides a convenient reference point for the analysis to follow. For example, quadrant ‘A1’
represents optimist’s preferred option wherein unions find a new role at the workplace and
for worker relations. Quadrant ‘A2’ is the non-workplace, social movement option. Quad-
rant ‘B1’, on the other hand, represents the best option that could be achieved in the view
of more sceptical commentators. They see the potential for management ‘abuse’ as far too
likely (i.e. quadrant ‘B2’).20
FIGURE 2
Union identity and potential union workplace outcomes
Moderate Identity (A1) (B2)
Union finds a new, independent
but collaborative role at the
workplace
Union becomes essentially incorpo-
rated within the company
(A2) (B1)
Militant Identity Union is marginalised from the
workplace
Union finds new ways to actively
counter the influence of modernisation
policies
4.1 ‘Radical/Political - Militancy’ – Between Traditional Capital and the
Mobile, ‘Global’ Firm
This section briefly analyses the identities of the two ‘militant’ unions at the
sites where modernisation has been much slower and piecemeal. This provides a par-
ticularly interesting contrast to the subsequent discussion of all three union identity
types at the two more highly modernised firms. However, what this section also high-
lights are the special problems that mobile, ‘global’ capital can cause for even the most
representative and powerful union group.
The key CUT São Bernardo Metal workers union is well known for its political
militancy but also for its policies and structures aimed at confronting the challenges of
 factory modernisation.
51 Aside from focussing on the situation of factory workers,
their interests have also spanned a wide variety of social issues and other groups in so-
ciety. Their systems of representation and feedback, both outside and inside many fac-
tories in the region, have given them the influence to negotiate a more explicit and fa-
vourable bargain from the modernisation process than has been possible in most other
locations. At the same time they have been at the forefront of important macro-political
developments such as the sector development programmes (câmaras setorias).
While the modernisation process was much slower and piecemeal at this factory
(Brastemp-São Bernardo) than at others in the region or in this research, the union was
                                                
51 For a review see; 1) DIEESE, ‘The Brazilian Metalworkers and the New Factory’s Challenge: A Ne-
gotiated Change at Mercedes-Benz’, paper presented to the International IR/HR Network on Autos, IIRA
10th World Congress Washington D.C., May 1995; and 2) L. P. Bresciani, ‘Restructuração Productiva e
Luta Sindical - O Trabalho na Indústria Automobilistica Brasileira - (1980-1995)’, paper prepared for the
project ‘Estrategias de Lucha Sindical en America Latina’, Centro de Estudos Sociologicos, El Colegio
de Mexico, 1995.21
quick to act when the firm did start changing.
52 Their agenda has challenged the use of
new factory techniques, questioned the basis of new training initiatives and insisted that
any new evaluation or occupational system must be fair and based on union input. Go-
slow campaigns and selective stoppages are a number of the ways in which they have
made their concerns felt. In terms of their interests, they have also put particular em-
phasis on health and safety issues, womens' rights and public service themes.
However, despite the influence and active role of the union overall, early at-
tempts to integrate structures for greater participant involvement (via factory commit-
tees and safety representatives) in the Brastemp–São Bernardo workplace constantly
came up against a very anti-union management stance. This confrontational situation
was underlined by a factory invasion in 199O. This was also the time when the com-
pany gave the first clear sign (i.e. the establishment of Brastemp-Rio Claro) that the
firm and Whirlpool were willing and able to move away from this high wage, unionised
region.
Yet the situation still held ambiguities and opportunities. For example, the early
to mid 1990s saw the firm launch their new HRM ‘Vision’,
 53 a factory modernisation
plan
54 and they agreed to a factory committee – one which was largely under the terms
the union desired.
55 Nevertheless, the union remained suspicious of what this strategy
meant at a workplace level. Moreover, they continued to use their media resources to
publicise an agenda and interests which went well beyond the workplace to a critique of
the global intentions of Whirlpool in Brazil and other parts of Latin America.
56 
Amidst improved macro conditions, between 1995-97 the company introduced
many new changes at the factory level
57 and there were very few open disputes between
management and the union.
58 Productive improvements such as transfer lines, ergo
                                                
52 The following analysis is based on a great deal of research. First, 12 intensive interviews were held
with Brastemp-São Bernardo union directors and factory representatives. Secondly, senior union staff
was interviewed on 4 occasions so as to put the Brastemp-São Bernardo situation within the broader
metal worker and CUT context. Thirdly, the researcher was often based at the DIEESE office in São
Bernardo. At these times numerous discussions were held and materials reviewed in relation to the union.
Finally, an intensive analysis was carried out of the union's journals and leaflets (1-2 per week) between
1985-94. See for
 a more extensive treatment, Pegler, ‘Politics of Modernisation’, ch. 7, pp. 262-264.
53 Ibid., ch. 4.
54 Ibid.
55 Brastemp, Regimento Interno da Comissão de Fabrica, Unidade de São Bernardo do Campo, 1994.
56 Noted in: Sindicato dos Metalúrgicos de São Bernardo e Diadema, Comissão de Fábrica dos Trabal-
hadores da Brastemp, São Bernardo do Campo, no 2, 12/91.
57 Based on a factory tour and interviews with Brastemp-São Bernardo personnel from Production and
HRM, January 2001.
58 Based on interviews with Brastemp workers at the São Bernardo Metal Workers Union, January 2001.22
nomic posts and new injection systems did not, in themselves, cause the union to much
concern. In addition, some relatively non-controversial changes such as technical
training, supervisory reductions and improved health and safety benefits were also in-
troduced.
However, as the decade progressed, economic conditions worsened (1998) and
the factory again resorted to large-scale layoffs. In response the union claimed that,
while they had been ‘promised stability if they worked harder’, all they were seeing
was massive productivity growth via the rationalisation of operations and the elimina-
tion of posts (e.g. in testing/quality assurance).
59 Further moves by the company to
simplify operations (via refrigeration system and small plastics outsourcing) and the
product line (to two) only served to persuade the union to relaunch and sharpen their
attacks on the company. Once again their agenda and interests encompassed both fac-
tory specific issues and broader political themes.
During their 1998 strike, representatives of their factory and safety committees
again came under severe pressure.
60 While some degree of calm was restored in the
year 2000, this was short-lived and may have masked an increasing degree of concern
amongst workers and the union. Recent simplifications to the factory plus the closure
of the Advanced Development Facility and the conversion of factory 1 into a super-
market during the late 1990s seemed to add up to one thing.
Yet internal worker statistics and surveys displayed very low turnover rates and
an unusual degree of worker contentment with the employer at this time.
61 In this envi-
ronment, it is also instructive to note a nuancing within the agenda and interests of this
union. High wages, high levels of unionisation, political clout plus the articulation of an
assertive set of workplace demands meant little in the face of the imminent closure and
partial relocation of the factory to the Consul site in Joinville.
Moreover, a broader view was that this highly concentrated industrial region
was starting to feel the effects of a process of de-industrialisation of which this may be
another example. Hence the union mixed its broad political criticism of the global and
regional policies of Whirlpool with a strongly local, developmental perspective.
62 They
                                                
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 Interview and data provided by Brastemp São Bernardo HRM department – ‘Acompannamento da
Pesquisa de Clima 1999 – Unidade São Bernardo de Campo’, Brastemp-São Bernardo, 2000.
62 Noted in discussions with DIEESE staff and the Union President and as illustrated in press releases
sent to the ‘Diario do Grande ABC’, sent to author on 5/2/2001.23
felt that a de-industrialisation process was neither necessary nor inevitable. The unions’
attempt to involve Mondragon in a co-operative rescue package for the factory reflected
this new emphasis within their identity.
This situation contrasts in many ways with the situation at Enxuta and for the
local union there - the Caxias Metal workers. Compared to the largely workplace foun-
dations of the São Bernardo union’s identity, the Caxias Metal Workers attempted to
translate a broad, critical, political perspective into a concrete agenda at the workplace.
However, what they did was too little and too late. The traditional high turnover 
approach and anti-union stance of the small group of dominant industrialists in this 
region merely added to the difficulties that this union faced. A brief review of this his-
tory illustrates the process of marginalisation which has occurred for this militant un-
ion.
63
The uneasy amalgam of communist, ‘traditional’ and CUT unionists who won
control of the union in 1987 espoused a broad political agenda which included foreign
debt non-payment, land reform and various measures for the re-distribution of income.
Their agenda did include other initiatives such as the formation of a safety committee,
anti-extra hours and young persons rights and their interests certainly extended to
groups outside the industrial workforce. Similarly, they saw the need for dialogue and
worker feedback and the importance of strategic actions around workplace themes.
However, they did relatively little to set up workplace structures beyond the promotion
of a safety committee.
The 1990s crash in the market made it even more difficult for the union to gain
worker support, especially by predominantly non-factory means. Moreover, the com-
pany had already added to its anti-union, high turnover policy the implicit threat that if
women (more than 50% of the workforce) pursued union agitation their transport and
crèche rights would be withdrawn. Nevertheless, health and safety conditions, dis-
crimination and onerous supervision conditions did act to promote a strike in 1990-91.
                                                
63 The following summary is based on a great deal of research. First, 10 interviews were held with union
operatives both before, during and after the 1993 intervention of the union. Research papers from the University of
Caxias were also referenced in an effort to expand the questionnaire-based discussions. The other source
developed by the researcher was a review of the union's pamphlets (1-2 per week) between 1985-94. A
more detailed presentation of the following discussion can be found in, Pegler, ‘The Politics of Moderni-
sation’, ch 7, pp. 265-267.24
Yet the end result of this was that nearly every unionist was sacked and only one safety
committee member remained in employment there.
Consequently, since 1990 the union has mixed its radical rhetoric with a more
pragmatic approach to negotiation. One of the reasons for this was that many other local
employers had modernised. While Enxuta was slow and piecemeal in this regard, it
seemed clear to the union directorate that new strategies were required. More practical
proposals dealing with health and safety, workplace processes and worker-union informa-
tion exchange began to be pursued from this time. The union’s directorate (thus forms of
dialogue) was also expanded (in 1994) so that greater focus could be put to pursuing fac-
tory level agreements within which workers would benefit from the modernisation proc-
ess.
However, subsequent years also saw significant improvements to the factory’s
previously poor - quality, human resource and management methods.
64 In addition, steady
growth in demand meant that the company was able to offer greater employment stability
and improved training and health and safety conditions during the second half of the
1990s.
65 The lack of any real union role in the factory plus the firm’s less aggressive in-
dustrial relations stance may even mean that workers are now more inclined to see the
firm as a promoter of workers’ rights.
In summary, this discussion has highlighted the very fragile and contingent nature
of union identity. What appears to be a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for union
influence and success – an existing role in the factory – has taken a further blow in recent
years at Enxuta (i.e. unionisation has fallen further to 18%).
66 The continuing local owner-
ship and domestic orientation of Enxuta probably means that the union still has some
chance of accessing this white goods factory – compared to the situation of capital flight
from São Bernardo, that is. However, they still face an uphill battle to have any real role at
an increasingly modernising Enxuta. Finally, while the two unions reviewed in this section
have taken on different shades of militancy, the analysis suggests that combative unions
could face even greater challenges at more modernised sites.
                                                
64 In fact a 1990 assessment of Enxuta by the BNDES (Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Economico
e Social) made it clear that these must change if Enxuta was to receive any financial assistance. Inter-
views held at the company in December, 2000, confirmed that further changes had been made since
1995.
65 Ibid. re company interviews.
66 Interview with Union Secretary, Caxias Metal Workers, December 2000. Also mentioned at that inter-
view was the unions concern about imminent introduction of further flexible work practices at the plant
through use of the options recently opened up by recent changes to Brazilian labour legislation.25
4.2 Comprehensive Modernisation and Union Diversity
Even before the identity model is applied to these two militant (the Limeira
Union in Rio Claro and the Mecânicos in Joinville) and one moderate (Sinditherme in
Joinville) unions, there are a number of structural indicators which are important to
consider.
67 First, as in many other parts of Brazil, the two militant unions faced consid-
erable opposition to even taking up the mandate they had won. The Limeira union
faced a jurisdictional challenge which kept them out of office between 1984-86.
68 Yet
after this they were able to raise their overall level of unionisation in the region quite
quickly.
69
The Mecânicos, on the other hand, won their election with a very high unioni-
sation rate ( 50%-60%)
70 but had total coverage of the Consul (and Embraco) work-
places removed from them a month before they were to take office in 1989. An appli-
cation by the former training director of Consul for a new union was made (with the
help of the company) and this was ratified at the state labour court.
71 The Mecânicos
then had to be content with a reduced role within the local metals sector and as an op-
position force ‘from the outside’. Yet it is ironic to note that it took the new union (Sin-
ditherme) five years to raise unionisation at the case study company up to the level
close to that achieved by the Mecânicos in 1989.
72
The statutes of these three unions show further differences between moderate
and militant union forms. They suggest that the militant unions may have broader and
more representative identities. For example, the statutes of the Mecânicos  and the
Limeira union specify regular elections, the importance of strong factory relations and
                                                
67 As discussed in Pegler, ‘The Politics of Modernisation’, ch. 7, pp.267-273.
68 See, Oposição Sindical Metalúrgico de Limeira e Região, 7/84, and Oposição Sindical Metalúrgico de
Limeira e Região, Boletim, no 1, 5-20/8/85.
69 For example, they raised overall unionisation from 20% to 35% between 1987-92 –
 Union and com-
pany interviews and Sindicato dos Metalúrgicos de Limeira e Região, Boletim, no 3, 1987; and Sindicato
dos Metalúrgicos e Ourives de Limeira e Região, Meta Luta, no 137, 23/10/91.
70 The unionisation figures used in this research come from both union records and company statistics.
As the companies have to know the number of sócio members for whom deductions are made, their
closeness to union figures serves to confirm the reliability of these figures.
71 The only aspect of this account which is disputed is who encouraged the original application for a new
union. An interview with Evacir Meler, Sinditherme President, (5/93), suggested that worker pressure led
to the establishment of the union and his presidency. The views of the Mecânicos and many Consul staff
question this. Research into pay records at Consul (12/93) confirmed that Consul was still paying the
Sinditherme president a (considerable) salary.
72 See footnote 70.26
principles such as solidarity and democracy within and beyond the union sphere.
73 This
represents a stark contrast to Sinditherme’s statute.
74
This union’s statute includes a service based, non-political orientation, less
regular elections, more stringent rules governing voting and it makes no formal provi-
sion for factory representation. A Sinditherme member must be an employee of one of
the firms for over two years and a much greater proportion of members are needed to 
call an assembly or force a vote. If workers miss a specified number of assemblies their
voting rights are removed and the statute also contains a very controversial clause
which states that if one of the directorate leaves, dies or retires, the mandate of all other
directors starts again for another five years. This clause has been used on a number of
occasions.
75
However, while this situation paints quite a stark picture there are still ambigui-
ties which need to be explored. For instance, despite their success across their region,
the Limeira union has not been able to raise unionisation at the case study site (Bras-
temp-Rio Claro) beyond a very low 16%. Secondly, despite statements otherwise,
service provision continues to play a central role for all unions in Brazil. Thirdly, in
spite of theoretically more open voting structures, the two militant unions have also
been able to solidify their hold on power relative to opposition groups.
76 It is not possi-
ble to say what relation this has to representation based on this information alone.
Starting with the Limeira union, the following discussion attempts to shed more light
on the identity dynamics behind these issues and situations for these three unions.
4.2.1 ‘Strategic Militancy’ and the New ‘Family’ of the Firm
By the mid-1990s the Limeira union had developed a clear, consistent and broad
identity that included a quite sophisticated and strategic approach to the internal poli-
cies of the modernising firm. Their policies for countering the new ‘family’ of the firm
                                                
73 See: Sindicato dos Trabalhadores nas Indústrias e Oficinas Mecânicas de Joinville (the Mecânicos),
'Estatuto', Joinville, 1991; and Sindicato dos Trabalhadores nas Indústrias Metalúrgicas, Mecânicas e
Ourives de Limeira e Região, (the Limeira Metals Union) ‘Estatuto’, Limeira, 1993.
74 See: O Sindicato dos Trabalhadores nas Indústrias de Refrigeração, Aquecimento e Tratamento de Ar,
Indústrias de Compressores Herméticos para Refrigeração e Indústrias de Artigos e Equipamentos
Odontológicos, Médicos e Hospitalares de Joinville (Sinditherme), 'Estatutos', Joinville, 1/8/92 and as
revised 1/3/93.
75 Interview with Mecânicos lawyer, Joinville, 11/94.
76 Situations highlighted  through reference to Sindicato dos Metalúrgicas de Limeira e Região (Limeira
Metals Union), Boletim, nos. 57, 61, Limeira, 1989 and as reported in A Noticia, Joinville, 26/1/92 p11
and 4/2/92 p.5.27
met with considerable success in all but the most modernised firm(s). The commence-
ment of their tenure during quite buoyant economic times (1986) may have helped
them yet there were other periods (such as the market crashes of 1989 and 1992) when
they had to find ways to adjust their approach to more difficult circumstances whilst
not loosing site of their core agenda, interests and forms of participant representation. A
brief review of these developments demonstrates the process by which this occurred.
77
Up to 1986 this former group of church based and CUT supporters took a
broad,radical political stance.
78 As with the Caxias union they emphasised agrarian re-
form, foreign debt non-repayment and income distribution disparities. Possibly due to
there underlying commitment to CUT principles, they did confront local employer
practices and argued against ‘extra hours’. Yet they had few specific workplace policies
or mechanisms and their interest group did not expand beyond the consideration of in-
dustrial workers.
However, as their tenure progressed a clear regularisation and local focus could
be seen in their identity.
79 Circumstances suggested that they must focus on services
and wage campaigns.
80 Moreover, they began to take a less categorically negative atti-
tude to the role of the state in defining the framework within which they worked.
81They
also began to believe that it was necessary to increase their local focus both within and
outside the workplace.
The late 1980s and early 1990s saw these changes become more distinct. For
example, in a major strike in 1989 they focussed more clearly on local issues and they
began to develop new vehicles for representation. From this time they made a point of
giving the state union tax back to workers who were paid up voluntary members.
82
Their 1992 conference focussed more on the links between national themes and local
employers
83 and their policies on health and safety linked their policies and services to
                                                
77 The pre-1995 situation is described in detail in, Pegler, ‘The Politics of Modernisation’, ch. 7, pp. 273-
277 and 281-285. The following, while still drawing on key primary data, is a precise of the union’s
identity in this period.
78 This is shown in union bulletins between 1984-86 (Oposição Sindical Metalúrgica de Limeira e Re-
gião, Boletim, 7/84 - 10/86, Limeira).
79 See: Pegler, ‘The Politics of Modernisation ‘, pp. 273-275.
80 E.g. unionist education courses were expanded. See: Sindicato dos Metalúrgicas de Limeira e Região
(hereafter the Limeira Metals Union), Boletim, 20/10/86.
81 See: Ibid.., nos. 9 and 10, 1987. However, the union also argued that workers must push for the expan-
sion of Constitutional benefits, Ibid.., no. 24, 1988.
82 See: Ibid., nos. 59 and 60, 1989, for a summary of IS devolution between 1987-89.
83 Ibid., no. 41, 1989.28
the identification of these problems on a company basis.
84 While the union expanded
their service function, they also used workplace questionnaires on a more regular basis
and their range of interests broadened considerably so that their policies and initiatives
came to focus on issues such as women workers, the poor and local service themes.
85
Nevertheless, this expansion in their identity was not without complications and
this was particularly the case in modernising firms who were portraying themselves as
‘the family in which workers could show allegiance’. The union was able to openly
criticise and counter these claims in instances where firms used a mix of modernisation
and ‘old style’ sackings and labour rights abuses.
86 However, comprehensive moderni-
sation (at this time virtually only Brastemp-Rio Claro) made it hard for the union to de-
velop a clear and consistent approach.
87
For instance, when asked about their wages compared to Brastemp- São Ber-
nardo the union found it difficult to criticise a situation where wages were high com-
pared to the regional average. Secondly, Brastemp- Rio Claro workers already worked
fewer hours than the union’s campaign target. Thirdly, this factory offered model con-
ditions in terms of safety and cleanliness and they had a career scheme – an issue that
the union could not be seen to openly criticise. Moreover, the scheme and its related
training and evaluative component were acting to divide the worker base. This added
complications to the unions already delicate policy balance between ‘professional’
wage adjustments and the pay of the less skilled. Finally, the transparency of the firm’s
new workplace model and rigor of its selection process made it easy for management to
keep unionists out of this workplace.
88
Even still the union worked through the political and economic ups- and- downs
of the early to mid-1990s with a clear and broad identity. Their preoccupation with in-
ternal employer policies grew, they continued to improve the relevance (i.e. the macro-
micro links) of their campaign structure and they introduced campaigns such as ‘the
union as body and soul’ to counter suggestions that the firm was worker’s new ‘fam
                                                
84 Ibid., nos. 58 and 59, 1989.
85 See: Ibid., no 36, 1988, for example.
86 See as an example: Ibid., (Special Edition - Varga), 2/90.
87 Examples below noted in interview with Adilson Cesar da Silva, Union Officer-Rio Claro, Limeira
Metals Union, 17/3/93 but also see Limeira Metals Union, Boletim (Special Edition - Brastemp-Rio
Claro), 2/90.
88 A point made by the union and by many of the worker interviewees.29
ily’.
89 For example, as an assertion of workers’ rights within modernisation they
launched a campaign entitled ‘there can be no quality of production without quality of
life’.
90
In terms of representation and the importance of the factory floor, they launched
the campaign ‘the place of a unionist is on the factory floor’ for which they received
significant support from Brasilia and the ILO.
91 In terms of health and safety, their ‘my
hands are the only ones I have’ campaign involved doctors, labour court endorsed fac-
tory inspections and feedback from worker and public meetings.
92 This integration of
concepts, local examples, local networks and discussion was also applied to other inter-
ests they had taken on - such as in respect to teachers/education and the poor/poverty
alleviation.
93 At the same time, their use of questionnaires continued to grow, their con-
ference became more local in emphasis, the formal union tax continued to be devolved
and (as part of their ‘body and soul’ campaign) many new forums, training sessions and
social occasions were established for workers and their families.
94
This approach worked well with most workers from the majority of the firms in
their ambit and was reflected in an average unionisation rate around 50%. However,
Brastemp-Rio Claro workers were conspicuous in their absence from the union’s con-
ference and the union continued to have difficulties criticising themes such as wages
and the career scheme. A broad campaign challenging employers to improve workers’
rights within the modernising firm plus a cry for workers to trust them (and not the em-
ployer) continued.
95 The relation of macro themes (e.g. globalisation and workers
rights) to local examples (e.g. Whirlpool) were also pushed.
96 Yet despite this inclu-
sive, representative and militant (but local and strategic) identity they did not appear to
                                                
89 This concise terminology was used in 1993, e.g. Limeira Metals Union, Boletim Especial - ‘A Alma e
o Corpo do Sindicato’, Limeira, (9/93). However, the approach can also be gleaned from the union’s
actions post-1991.
90 See: Limeira Metals Union, Boletim Específico aos Trabalhadores da Varga, 19/8/91.
91 See: Sindicato dos Metalúrgicos de Limeira e Região, Dossier - Contra Demissões e Afastamentos de
Sindicalista (São Paulo 1991). On the campaign and the support it received see, Limeira Metals Union,
Meta Luta, no. 132, 1991.
92 Ibid., (Special - Accidents), 8/92.
93 Limeira Metals Union, Meta Luta, nos. 193, 193 207, 208, 209, 211 (1993) and Special bulletin -
10/93 (‘body and soul theme’; education).
94 See: Limeira Metals Union, Informativo - O Metalúrgico em Casa, ano 1, no. 1, 5/92; Ibid., nos. 116,
123 and 122, (1991), (on the IS); and  Sindicato dos Metalúrgicos de Limeira e Região, Resoluções - 2nd
Congresso, Limeira, 15-17/3/91.
95 This criticism included the 'Brazilian Skilled Worker' contest - Limeira Metals Union, Meta Luta, no.
210, 1993.
96 Limeira Metals Union, Meta Luta, no. 173, 1992.30
have found a way to enter ‘the hearts and minds’ of Brastemp-Rio Claro workers. Just
over 15% unionisation seemed the best they could achieve at this firm up to the mid-
1990s.
Despite some difficulties containing rising labour turnover
97 the firm made sig-
nificant ‘advances’ in their strategic approach and model of workplace relations during
the later half of the 1990s.
98 Along with Consul (and Embraco), Joinville, the firm has
become the centre-piece in Whirlpool’s Brazilian and Latin American operations. Proc-
ess technologies continue to be the most advanced and their product developments have
even closer ties to the regional and export plans of the TNC which now totally controls
this facility.
99
Most significantly, in terms of employee conditions and attitudes, there have
been new and more sophisticated advances in HRM practices for shopfloor workers.
100
For example, a variety of  new participation schemes (including one based on profit
sharing for hourly workers) and discussion and development groups have been intro-
duced. Based on participation rates in QCCs (90%) these appear to have been more
successful than the past. Secondly, while formal, basic education provision has been
stopped, training hours per worker have increased to around 40 per worker p.a. and this
training is more advanced than in the past. Most importantly, (while put on hold be-
tween 1997-98) the career scheme continues to represent an important avenue of devel-
opment, particularly for the lower skilled.
These developments on the earlier model have allowed the firm to achieve even
higher levels of productivity.
101 Along with late 1990s economic difficulties, the
changes to participation, training and re-introduction of the career plan are probably
behind the return to low turnover levels of the early 1990s (i.e. 2-3%).
102 Moreover, the
fact that the firm has maintained steadily rising blue collar employment levels ever
since its inception is probably a strong indication to workers that (with what is still a
model, local employer) they can achieve a good deal of employment security and con
                                                
97 Due to economic growth, the effect of their earlier policy to employ younger, more educated workers
and, perhaps, worker dissatisfaction.
98 As discussed at an interview  with the plant manager and during a factory tour – Brastemp-Rio Claro,
January 2001.
99 Ibid.
100 Below details given to author in an interview  with the Brastemp-Rio Claro HRM manager, January
2001.
101 Products per day per worker have risen from just over 3 to just over 5 between 1995-2001.
102 Footnote 100.31
tinuity.
103 Yet this does not mean that there have not been issues upon which the union
has or could not launch rigorous campaigns along the lines of the past.
During this more recent period the union has not let up on its political orienta-
tion, broad interest group focus, innovative thematic/local campaigns (e.g. on health
and safety) or their policy to use the devolution of the union tax to promote more active
unionism.
104 The requirement that issues such as flexible hours, the spreading of hours
(thus the issue of overtime diminution) and use of temporary workers must receive
workplace approval has given them other themes on which to try and engage workers at
this and other factories
105 Moreover, it is not inconceivable that the existence of mas-
sive levels of RSI
106, inconsistencies within the career scheme plus the arrival of other
such firms with higher wages and factory committees in the region, could not be made
more of.
107 However, up until 2001, a combination of factory conditions and (albeit
more subtle) anti-unionism continue to keep this union a very minor player at this firm.
Unionisation has fallen to 6%.
4.2.2 ‘Radical/Political Militancy’ vs the ‘Moderate Identity’: New Realism – Old
Realities?
Compared to the Limeira union’s genesis during the boom of 1986, just when
the Mecânicos should have been celebrating they found themselves (in 1989) in the
midst of an economic crisis and without coverage of the three most important metals
firms in their ambit. This left them in a dilemma – modernisation was not an issue in
the smaller firms they now covered and workers were showing even less empathy to
broad political campaigns against capitalist processes than in the past. It looked like
this situation would destroy them. Yet they continued with their defiant political ap-
proach.
                                                
103 Verified in Ibid. (500-600 blue collar employees) - for past see: Pegler, ‘The Politics of Modernisa-
tion’, ch. 4., table 4.3, p.130.
104 As discussed in interview with Limeira union officers in January 2001. Also evident from, Limeira
Metals Union, Metaluta, no. 284, 1997 and no. 311, 1999.
105 As noted by: Ibid., 301, 1998, and for Brastemp (Ibid., March, 1998) and for the region in Jornal
Unificado (Metalworkers of Limeira and Campinas), March, 1998.
106 Noted in Brastemp-Rio Claro HRM interview and by factory observation, January 2001.
107 That is, as noted from 2001 interviews, worker dissatisfaction increases when many reach the top of
the career ladder. Company attempts to slow their progress/put the scheme on hold, have added to these
inconsistencies.32
In their bulletins they vigorously condemned Sinditherme and the government
which allowed its creation.
108 They even believed that a 1990 stoppage by Consul and
Embraco had been actively used by the companies to sack union sympathisers and
older skilled workers (who seemed to be keen Mecânico supporters) so that they could
employ and train younger, less skilled workers.
109 Nevertheless, even though their calls
for political support on such a major local theme brought little response, their approach
remained a broad political critique of inequality and foreign debt plus a call for agrarian
reform and class solidarity.
110
While they put more focus on wage issues and their poorly used services, their
identity minimised any possible ambiguities.
111 Their ‘electorate’ was industrial work-
ers and, even though they were clearly aware of the issue, they had no desire to focus
on the nuances involved in the factory modernisation debate. Moreover, while their
agenda was broad and political they steered away from the potential problems that
might emerge through the support of national CUT policies such as – ‘no extra hours’
and ‘professional’ wage policies.
112 They would not accept any possible trade off be-
tween extra hours and employment and they felt that support for ‘professional’ wages
would conflict with their desire to help the lowliest paid workers.
113
Prior to the crises of 1992 this approach allowed them to survive. As long as
they made some (theoretically) good gains on the wages and overtime fronts they did
not have to look for innovative campaigns which linked services, factory issues and
other actors (for example).They made no move to devolve the union tax
114 and looked
instead at the possibility of forging new links with other regional unions. They were
aiming to regroup and fight on more ‘traditional’ ground.
115
Yet the 1992 crisis severely weakened their most successful tool. In response,
they made more vigorous calls for worker assemblies but turnout rates fell even fur
                                                
108 E.g.: Sindicato dos Trabalhadores nas Indústrias e Oficinas Mecânicas de Joinville (hereafter Mecâni-
cos), Boletim Informativo - Sindicato Forte, ‘Trabalhadores da Consul, Embraco e Kavo do Brasil’, no.
12, 1990.
109 As claimed by Wilson Vieira, President, Mecânicos, Joinville, (5/93).
110 Ibid., 6/90.
111 The following points emerged from interviews with Wilson Viera, President, Mecânicos, particularly
in 5/93. The union did, however, try to infiltrate CIPAs.
112 Ibid..
113 See: Mecânicos, Boletim Informativo - Sindicato Forte, 11/90.
114 Mecânicos, Tribuna, no.5, 1991.
115 Well illustrated in their 1991 publication, Mecânicos, ‘A Grev’ (the strike). See also Mecânicos,
Tribuna, no. 6, 1992; and, Mecânicos, Special leaflet on industrial action - 1989-92 (untitled), 1992.33
ther.
116 In contrast and possibly in response to this, the years 1993-95 saw them make
significant changes to their identity.
117
During these years, they continued to put considerable energy into forging links
with regional metals unions and the local plastics union (who itself was making quite a
focussed critique of factory modernisation.
118. However, they also became involved in 
regional level training courses in respect to factory modernisation and they expanded
their range of campaigns and union structures to include a broader range of interest
groups.
119 In terms of negotiation, the state was seen more as a potential ally than an
agent of capital
120 and they opened up greater dialogue with firms on issues such as re-
training and a better model for the ‘division of responsibilities’ for worker services.
121
They were now also against ‘extra hours’ The question was: Was this also too little too
late?
122
The Sinditherme experience provides a massive contrast with this situation. Up
to the mid- 1990s they produced very few bulletins for their members and when they
did these included numerous advertisements for the company’s products. Most impor-
tantly, in their first bulletin they laid out a clear blueprint of their moderate identity.
123 
For example, they argued that quality and productivity were positive themes
which workers should embrace – a common interest they had with employers.
124 Simi-
larly, stability was an individual rather than a statutory issue which workers would
achieve if they co-operated and trained hard.
125 Likewise, workers’ health and safety
concerns could be solved via discussion and suggestions - not by agitation.
126 In the
area of wage negotiations, the problem was inflation not the government. Finally, it
                                                
116 A point well illustrated by the language of, Ibid., no. 6, 1992.
117 See: Pegler, ‘The Politics of Modernisation’, pp. 285 – 288, for an enlarged discussion of what is
summarised here.
118 The Plásticos were well versed on modernisation issues. See for example: Sindicato dos Plásticos de
Joinville, Boletim de Circulação Nacional, ‘Modernidade Pra Quem’ (Modernity for who?), 1992, Join-
ville.
119  An exploratory course was held for 36 union officers and workers between 2-4 of June 1992 -
Mecânicos, ‘Relatório da 1a Tapa de Curso para Dirigentes’, 2-4 June, 1992.
120 Increasingly, these issues dominated the union’s bulletins, e.g. Ibid., nos. 5, 6 and 10, 1993.
121 Mecânicos, Tribuna, no 4 and 6, 1993.
122 See: Sindicatos dos Trabalhadores Mecânicas e Plásticos de Joinville, Portão de Fábrica, ano 1, no 1,
11/93.
123 Sinditherme, Jornal, ano 1, no. 1, 11/91.
124 Ibid., p. 2.
125 Ibid.
126 Ibid., p. 3.34
was clear that services would be the union’s main preoccupation.
127 However, they
claimed that they were the independent conduit for channeling workers’ concerns.
128
Sinditherme’s actions confirmed this moderate and conservative image. For ex-
ample, very few assemblies have ever been called by their white collar, ‘so-called’
factory representatives and the union did not seek workers views on issues such as the
union tax or wage campaign options.
129 In similar fashion, the union actively helped to
limit anticipated wage rises at Embraco in the early 1990s ‘due to liquidity problems
the company was facing’.
130 While this was also the year that Embraco (thus Whirl-
pool) purchased a compressor facility in Italy, the union supported its approach with
claims that everyone must make sacrifices, that this decision would not be appealed and
that it was an across-the-board percentage rise.
131
A clearly narrow, employer friendly, inactive identity had been established. In
terms of its agenda, the union was positive about employer defined moderation
132, ac-
cepting of the market and against what it called ‘political unionism’.
133 In terms of its
interests, these were narrow – confined not just to workers but to workers in these three
firms. Groups such as women and the poor received no mention and, while they were
not aggressive on wage growth, its approach on wage differentials clearly favoured the
most skilled. While the union claimed that it took an interest in workplace change, the
union made no efforts to promote new vehicles for participant representation on this or,
in fact, on any other issue.
134
Nevertheless, in 1993 the union secured a salary deal which is virtually unheard
of in Brazil. This was for significant base level adjustments and immediate, full infla-
tionary salary adjustments for all.
135 The union had also managed to put in place a
range of health and recreation services for members which would be the envy of any
                                                
127 Ibid., p. 4.
128 Ibid., p. 3.
129 I.e. records of only a few assemblies could be found for the 1989-93 period.
130 Confirmed at interview with, Evacir Meler, President, Sinditherme, 5/93. The unions first journal
(Sinditherme, Jornal, no. 1, p1) also underlines the union's view that workers’ objective should be to im-
prove company efficiency.
131 Sinditherme, Jornal, ano 1, no.4, 10/92, p. 4.
132 Ibid., no 3, p. 4.and via an interview, Evacir Melor, Sinditherme President, 5/93.
133 Ibid., no. 4, 1992, p. 2.
134 As claimed in an interview with Evacir Melor, Union President, Sinditherme, 5/93, their job was to
motivate workers not to be involved in factory level change or ‘political discussions’.
135 As shown in: Sinditherme, Jornal, ano II, no.4, 5/93; and listed in, ‘Mecânicos’, Tribuna, Sinditherme
- Consul/Embraco/ Kavo - ‘Declaração’, 9/12/93.35
organisation.
136 The high level of unionisation it achieved by the mid-1990s suggested
that, while it had started with a low unionisation rate, a significant and growing number
of workers had become interested in an association with the union.
137
However, there are other developments which suggest that its strategy was not
exactly what its members believed it was or wanted and that focussing on unionisation
rates alone can be very misleading. First, despite professing an a-political orientation,
in 1993 the union proposed that the Regional Metals Federation should affiliate with
Força Sindical.
138 Secondly, after nearly five years as the formal representative of
workers at the three firms, Sinditherme decided that 1994 would be the year for the un-
ion to start conducting questionnaires at a factory level to find out what workers’ views
and demands were.
139
This was the situation which emerged by the mid -1990s. While there were major
differences in the identities of these two unions, both sought strength through political af-
filiation (of some sort) and neither had any real desire to confront the challenges of factory
modernisation. The growing importance of Consul and Embraco within the Whirlpool and
global white goods market plus the growing flexibility of the Brazilian industrial relations
environment are two key factors which acted to further expose the weakness of both these
union types during the later half of the 1990s.
The late 1990s saw Consul become the key part of Whirlpool’s Latin American re-
frigeration operations. Embraco was the launching pad for Whirlpool’s global compressor
network. In terms of the Consul factory, this period also witnessed the streamlining and
‘improvement’ of their workplace modernisation model.
140 Products became further sim-
plified and their marketing more coordinated - by Whirlpool. Process technologies were
improved by further transfer lines, electronics and cell structures. Outsourcing was taken
to a new level. The firm removed itself from a direct role in small products and services
and, most significantly, in the more high skilled tooling function. Moreover, while many
white collar personnel still work in the company’s offices most of these actually work for
independent firms.
                                                
136 Interview: Evacir Meler, Sinditherme, (5/93). He suggested that the union’s doctors saw 80 workers
(or their family members) per day.
137 That is, about 50% compared to 40% (Mecânicos- their firms) and the Limeira Metals Union (only
16% at Brastemp-Rio Claro).
138 Interview: José Negerherbow, Secretary, Sinditherme, Joinville, 11/93.
139 Interview: Evacir Melor, President, Sinditherme, Joinville, 5/93.
140 The following points were made during interviews with HRM staff and during a factory tour in De-
cember, 2000.36
Of more specific relevance to the issue of worker conditions and union re-
sponses is the fact that the company’s HRM policies have continued to ‘progress’.
141
Like at Brastemp-Rio Claro, while general education has been curtailed much more
training in advanced techniques and electronics are on offer. Quality programmes,
group and individual discussions and evaluations are now more frequent and the physi-
cal working environment is claimed to be much better. It is also very interesting to note
that the firm has now moved much closer to the explicit career plan structure being em-
ployed at Brastemp- Rio Claro.
Such developments make workers skills and attitudes of even greater impor-
tance to the firm.
142 Thus, along with low turnover rates (1%) and rising productivity,
the firm seems pleased that most indicators of workplace and individual satisfaction are
high. However, for the 1997-2000 period it is instructive to note that many workers felt
that their ‘level of remuneration’ and ‘opportunities to grow’ were relatively low.
143
Moreover, indicators of ‘factory relations’, ‘ambient’, ‘confidence in the employer’ and
‘liberty at work’ all fell in the three years up to 2000.
144 Yet, as with the technical ad-
justments note above, the question is: What role has either union played in this situa-
tion?
Between 1985 and 2000 Sinditherme appears to have done little to change from
its previous service orientated, employer supportive but inactive workplace role.
145
While its attempts to find regional political partners have continued, its closed and un-
representative features have been instrumental in allowing Consul to introduce a variety
of industrial relations changes at the firm. In contrast to the present situation at Bras-
temp–Rio Claro and pre-closure situation at Brastemp-São Bernardo, this company is
now making use of temporary workers, regular flexible hour schemes and a ‘banca das
horas’ (the spreading of yearly hours to get over seasonal demand thus reduction in
overtime) scheme.
146 The only irony is that while the company now has these options,
the Mecânicos long legal battle to regain coverage of Consul and Embraco workers has
                                                
141 Those noted below were discussed in interviews with Consul HRM staff in December, 2000.
142 Now between 5-7 products per worker per day – factory discussion, Consul, December 2000.
143 As shown in: Pesquisa de Clima Organizacional, Multibras-Unidade Joinville, 2000 and in internal
statistical tables supplied by HRM staff – December, 2000.
144 Ibid.
145 Based on discussions with Joinville Metal Workers, December, 2000.
146 Verified in discussions with Consul, HRM staff, December, 2000.37
resulted (October, 2000) in coverage of Consul workers going back to the more militant
union (the Mecânicos).
147
However, while this situation would appear to give the Mecânicos some hope
for the future, it appears that they have also done very little to improve their role as a
representative union in the intervening years.
148 Strike campaigns and associated at-
tempts to raise union dues have resulted in divisions and the loss of many members.
Their attempts to combine with the Plastics union did not work but they continue to 
battle for stronger political linkages at the regional level. Similarly, they continue to
push a broad political agenda yet in reality they have had to put most day- to- day em-
phasis on service provision. Their aversion to link their policies and strategies with na-
tional CUT policy themes or workplace developments are other enduring characteristics
of this union.
Finally, what the Mecânicos are banking on is their ability to develop strong
relations with Consul workers. They believe that their strong links with skilled workers
at Embraco will also help them win back that factory. The sad fact is that, beyond a de-
sire to build stronger, independent locally based unionism, they are still doing very lit-
tle to prepare themselves for the ambiguities that Consuls wave of factory modernisa-
tion appears to make created.
149 Yet they may have to build new structures of repre-
sentation/ engagement at the workplace to have any real impact at this factory. Conse-
quently, while these unions differ in many ways, they both seem to represent the con-
tinuation of ‘traditional’ Brazilian unionism.
                                                
147 Noted in interview with Mecânicos and Regional Metals representatives, Joinville, December, 2000.
148 Ibid. These lengthy discussions highlighted the below points plus clear conflicts within the Mecânicos
group and between them and the Regional (CUT) representatives – in spite of the fact that the Mecânicos
now had the chance of a ‘’new life’’ through their recently regained coverage of Consul workers.
149 Ibid.38
5 CONCLUSION: UNION IDENTITY AND MODERNISATION – THEMES
AND AMBIGUITIES
A prominent view in the recent literature is that factory modernisation will be a
key force for changes in union identity. Optimists suggest that unions will be able to re-
capture their relevance to changed conditions by embracing more moderate identities.
There are two optimistic ideal types to how this moderation may evolve. First, unions may
become more service orientated, company specific and narrow in their focus. Alterna-
tively, union agendas and interests may broaden but lose a workplace focus. In contrast to
optimists, this chapter’s analysis of union identity has suggested that more pessimistic in-
corporation and marginalisation outcomes are more likely in the typical Brazilian context.
There were two levels to this chapter’s interest in the union identity-modernisation 
debate. These were, how have unions adjusted and have they become effective and suc-
cessful representatives at the workplace. Secondly, have unions’ political aims become
more difficult to sustain as a result of a growth in the importance of workplace change.
These questions were addressed through the application of a model of union identity to the
unions’ experiences, especially those unions at the most modernised locations where both
moderate and militant unions are involved. However, the experience of the unions at the
least modernised sites provided a vision of the difficulties faced by combative unions of
any complexion and at any site, particularly if the union has little workplace role and in
situations where capital is quite mobile.
The detailed review of union identity at the most modernised sites confirmed that a
wide variety of union identities can emerge. Overall, the two CUT unions (the Limeira
metal workers and the Mecânicos) stand out in stark contrast to Sinditherme. Their agen-
das are broader, their interests encompass other groups and both appear to have clear de-
sires to create active participant relations with workers. However, there are some impor-
tant differences between the two CUT unions.
After winning control of their union, the Limeira group began to moderate their
focus away from radical political-economic themes. Their agenda became more regular-
ised, co-ordinated and focused on practical day-to-day issues. A greater reliance on state
structures and decisions also emerged. Yet this did not stop them from developing a broad
range of industrial claims, from actively pushing the limits of state regulation or from
continuing to promote links to the CUT.39
On the other hand, the Mecânicos were far more reluctant to moderate their ap-
proach. They continued to push a broad, political agenda but narrow range of interests up
to the point where circumstances almost forced them to cease to exist. At this later date
they started to think more seriously about modernisation issues. They also began to take a
less categorical view of wage-employment tradeoffs and the ‘need’ for regulation, nego-
tiation and compromise. However, horizontal union re-grouping has continued to be of
primary important to their (regional) strategy.
Both these unions were facing difficult and contradictory decisions as a result of
modernisation strategies in their regions. Nonetheless, the practical demonstration of the
Limeira union's credentials (e.g. their health and safety campaigns, the devolution of the
IS and their clearer attempt to confront modernisation issues) distinguishes them from the
Mecânicos. A similar concerted and broad approach can be seen in their range of interests
compared to the Mecânicos.
Sinditherme also had a policy on modernisation and at the end of the period their
services were quite extensive compared to the other two unions. Unionisation for them
was also much higher - overall (50%) and for their case study firm (50%). However, the
analysis highlighted a number of serious formal and informally based caveats to the con-
clusion that they have been as representative as the other two unions. Their identity can
best be summed up as active in its omission. Compared to the CUT unions, they do not
wish to become involved in the workplace and feel that unions and workers should place
less emphasis on the state and statutory regulation. Conciliatory relations with employers
and a focus on the individual come through strongly in their policies and ‘actions’.
Furthermore, there are aspects of Sinditherme which call into question the notion
of ‘modernity’ and its relation to the Brazilian industrial relations context. For example,
Sinditherme considers itself to be a progressive union and it does engage in modernisation
terminology. However, its inaction, service focus and inclination to accept employer pol-
icy illustrate that even workplace modernisation does not necessarily produce qualitatively
distinct breaks from past industrial relations habits. These past habits are also far from
democratic.
Another point which highlights the difficulty of the Brazilian context is that all
three unions stress the difficulty they have engaging workers on any topic, particularly in
relation to the most micro workplace issue and the most macro political theme. The Sin-
ditherme identity stands out as it drives a wedge between a workplace and an overtly po-
litical orientation, concentrating on the traditional areas of services and wage conciliation.40
This may be a sensible strategy in view of employers’ attitudes and as workers put a lot of
weight on pay and union services. However, it does not mean that Sinditherme is repre-
sentative, particularly in view of the picture of modernisation and workers’ attitudes given
in this paper.
Nevertheless, the worrying issue for groups such as the Limeira metal workers is
that, despite their innovative attempts to meld workplace, local and national themes within
a much more representative identity, this has had little effect at Brastemp-Rio Claro. It is
sour consolation to the union that the application of more sophisticated modernisation
strategies at a ‘greenfields’ site have helped ensure a virtually non-union factory in the
midst of a region with rising union sympathies. Metal workers in Joinville seem more
radical than the (unrepresentative) union they had up to 2001. However, at the Brastemp-
Rio Claro site it doesn’t appear to matter whether the union moderates its approach or not,
workers still don’t appear very interested.
Finally, a few points about the specific policy dilemmas created for unions (by
modernisation) in other contexts need to be made. First, it would appear that the continu-
ing evolution of more representative and effective unions requires detailed policies for
particular skill groups and workplace issues, in addition to the articulation of general un-
ion principles. While a policy stance of this nature will be difficult, these will be the types
of issues the Mecânicos will now have to deal with. On the other hand, if global capital is
becoming increasingly mobile, unions may have to confront this through coordination and
international action.
The above point about union coordination serves to highlight another problem for
labour movements. Vertical union structures are important for the articulation of policies
on issues such as Government regulation and on broader economic-political concerns.
However, firm specific modernisation practices may render the standardisation of any-
thing beyond the most general of issues increasingly irrelevant. State regulation, political
unionism and vertical union structures may become even more meaningless than they al-
ready are as modernisation progresses. The situation at Brastemp-Rio Claro may represent
an early example of this dilemma.41
APPENDIX
TABLE 1
Factory typologies and outcomes - refrigeration
Indicator / Factory Brastemp
São Bernardo












Older and not integrated Mixed / not integrated New and integrated
Workplace and human
resources policies
Mainly a wage based
relation / recent changes
Some new tasks / training New tasks, training
and workplace ambient
Supervision Old / overt Newer style New and open
OUTCOMES:
Productivity = products per
worker per day
1.7 1.2 2.6
Turnover = % per annum 8.4 % 6.0 % 1.5 %
Wages = US $ per month;
skill weighted
US $ 430 US $ 344 US $ 365
Supervision = % of factory
employment














Sources: Factory data, interviews and observation   
TABLE 2
Factory typologies and outcomes – washing products
Indicator / Factory Brastemp – Rio Claro Enxuta
Management style and struc-
tures




New, automated and integrated Older / less automated  / not integrated
Workplace and human re-
sources policies
New tasks, benefits and opportunities Few concerns for work pressure or con-
ditions
Supervision Open / less overt Old style / overt
OUTCOMES*:
Productivity  3.1 1.5
Turnover  2.4 % - 12.5 %  61.2 %
Wages  US $ 253 US $ 292











Sources: Factory data, interviews and observation   
* Outcome measures as shown in table 242
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